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Abstract. Traditionally cyber security has focused on defending against
external threats, over the last decade we have seen an increasing aware-
ness of the threat posed by internal actors. Current approaches to re-
ducing this risk have been based upon technical controls, psychologically
understanding the insider’s decision-making processes or sociological ap-
proaches ensuring constructive workplace behaviour. However, it is clear
that these controls are not enough to mitigate this threat with a 2019
report suggesting that 34% of breaches involved internal actors. There
are a number of Insider threat frameworks that bridge the gap between
these views, creating a holistic view of insider threat. These models can
be difficult to contextualise within an organisation and hence developing
actionable insight is challenging. An important task in understanding an
insider attack is to gather a 360-degree understanding of the incident
across multiple business areas: e.g. co-workers, HR, IT, etc. can be key
to understanding the attack. We propose a new approach to gathering
organic narratives of an insider threat incident that then uses a compu-
tational approach to map these narratives to an existing insider threat
framework. Leveraging Natural Language Processing (NLP) we exploit a
large collection of insider threat reporting to create an understanding of
insider threat. This understanding is then applied to a set of reports of
a single attack to generate a computational representation of the attack.
This representation is then successfully mapped to an existing, manual
insider threat framework.
Keywords: Insider Threat · Natural Language Processing · Organic
Narratives.
1 Introduction
An insider threat can be defined as ‘a current or former employee, contractor, or
business partner who has or had authorised access to an organisation’s network,
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system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a man-
ner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the
organisation’s information or information systems’ [6] and represents a major
security risk to organisations. A 2019 report compiled by Verizon suggests that
34% of all data breaches involved an internal actor and 15% of actions taken
during a breach were misuse of a system by authorised users [32]. Insiders were
shown to be particularly common in specific sectors such as the Public Sector
(30% of all breaches), Finance (36% of all breaches) and Healthcare (59% of all
breaches). It is clear that despite the increased availability of technical solutions
and the increased awareness of the insider threat, insiders are still able to plan
and commit attacks.
The current state of the art approaches to understand, and ultimately pre-
vent insider threat, usually consider either technical [11,1,8], psychological or
sociological [17,12,4] approaches with a small number of models which encap-
sulating a number of these factors (e.g. [27]). Within this domain, technical
solutions usually aim to restrict or detect insider threat activity, distinguishing
malicious activity from non-malicious activity; this is often very challenging as,
by definition, the insider activity can closely resemble normal, ‘everyday’ activity.
Alternatively, the psychological and sociological approaches aim to understand
the factors and decision-making processes involved in initially becoming a threat
and then the process of moving from a threat to committing a malicious act.
However, in isolation these approaches are usually not enough to fully under-
stand and contextualise the threat from an insider attack within an organisation.
There are also a number of frameworks which attempt to bring together these ap-
proaches to create a more holistic understanding of the problem, acknowledging
that the threat from insiders is a nuanced socio-technical problem [7,19]. These
frameworks can provide an abstract appreciation for the relevant factors but it
can be challenging to map this understanding to a tangible set of mitigations
which can reduce the risk from insider threat.
Following a security breach from an insider it is important to gather in-
formation regarding the incident, gathering data from co-workers including the
individual’s peers, juniors and seniors, human resources and those in a staff man-
agement role, in addition to IT or security personnel. This represents a diverse
community of individuals all of whom may have important information pertain-
ing to the incident. With research showing that these individuals are willing to
write reports about an incident when one has occurred, giving investigators im-
portant information regarding an attack [10]. This research acknowledges that
casting this evidence base into an insider threat framework will help to evaluate
the incident, however the mechanism by which this model integration could lead
to erroneous sense-making.
Requiring this variety of individuals to cast their understanding into frame-
work, may bias individuals’ recollections of the events and exhibited behaviours
as individuals attempt to cast their story into the model framework. In addition
there is a cognitive load associated with performing this activity, particularly
with those who are not familiar with the framework being used. These factors
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can result in a view of the incident which is distorted to fit into existing un-
derstandings of insider threat, rather than accurately encapsulating the events
associated with the insider attack.
In this paper we describe a computational approach to collecting reports of
insider attacks that uses organic narratives describing the insider attack to build
a model representation of the incident. It is important to understand that these
organic narratives are created by non-experts and represent ‘free’ text written
in ‘natural’ language. The aim is that this reduces both the security expertise,
and the cognitive load required to contribute information to an investigation
of an insider threat attack. This computational approach is unsupervised and
delivers a model representation of the attack derived from a corpus of organic
narratives, this model is free from assumptions about how insider threat attacks
have traditionally been committed allowing a rich understanding of new and
emerging attacks.
In this paper we first discuss the background to this work, then introduce our
approach and describe an experiment validating the ability for our approach to
produce models that accurately represent insider threat. We finally discuss the
implications of our approach and highlight future research directions exploiting
this technology.
2 Background
2.1 Insider Threat
As previously discussed insider threat is defined as ‘A current or former em-
ployee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorised access to an
organisation’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of the organisation’s information or information systems’ [6]. These
attacks can be more dangerous than attacks from external actors as insider of-
ten have access to privileged information, valid credentials and knowledge of
potential security systems. Security compromises form insider actions often fol-
low 4 primary archetypes [6]. The first three archetypes are associated with a
malicious insider, these include insider fraud, insider IT sabotage and insider IP
theft; the final archetype is the so-called unintentional insider threat which can
be defined as an insider who ‘. . . through action or inaction without malicious
intent unwittingly causes harm or substantially increases the probability of future
serious harm’ [13].
The current approaches for understanding insider threat can be characterised
into three general approaches; the first is a technical approach that aims to
understand the technical artefacts an insider leaves on an IT system and from
this identify or block activity associate with an insider threat, (e.g. [25]). The
challenges in this approach is that by the nature of insider activity, it often
closely resembles everyday activity and is often perpetrated by those who have
the knowledge to reduce their exposure to technical detection mechanisms.
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The psychological and sociological approaches aim to understand any pre-
disposition resulting from personality which increases the risk of becoming an
insider threat (for example, [22]), additionally, there are other approaches which
attempt to model the decision-making during the transition of an employee to
becoming an insider threat (for example, [14]).
The socio-technical characterisation of the insider threat is typically brought
together in the third approach to understanding insider threat, using a frame-
work or model in order to understand the complex and nuanced interactions
between the different elements. The relationships between these elements asso-
ciated with insider threat can form complex feedback loops, which attempt to
model the individual, the environment or organisation and the security incident
itself. These typically acknowledge that technical controls are often insufficient
to manage the risk from insider threat [9] and a holistic understanding of the
risk and hence controls is essential to begin to manage the risk.
These models of insider threat (for example [27,20,5,23]) typically identify
a set of themes as related to insider threat and then identify connections be-
tween the themes, typically highlighting causal relationships. These relationships
demonstrate opportunities for mitigations or detection, whilst also highlighting
possible feedback loops that look to increase the likelihood of, for example a
successful attack or an employee becoming a threat in the first place. In an
academic sense these models are very useful for understanding the interactions
between a variety of environmental and technical elements as well as the effect
of individual differences, however when translated into an organisational work-
place or as a tool for post-hoc exploration of an incident they typically require
a knowledgeable security professional to carefully explore the evidence from a
number of sources and then contextualise this evidence within the model.
There are two approaches to post-hoc exploration of an incident using a
model, the first involves collecting the evidence surrounding the incident di-
rectly in a model with individuals who are providing evidence doing so directly
into a model representation. This relies on those reporting the incident to be
able to contextualise their observations into a model, insider attacks are often
nuanced and complex [7] which can mean this contextualisation is very challeng-
ing and requires a significant amount of domain knowledge, it can also result
in observations of incident being unconsciously adjusted to fit the model, rather
than accurately represent the incident.
The alternative approach to post-hoc exploration of an incident is for an
investigator to collect a number of different reports of the incident and then
contextualise these within a model. This potentially represents a more accurate
approach as by encouraging individuals to report their observations as organic
narratives written in ‘natural’ language allows an individual to represent the
incident to the best of their ability. However, this approach requires a signifi-
cantly skilled individual to gather this information and contextualise it within
a model, this will typically be a security domain expert. They will likely have
individual bias as to what is expecting to be seen, based on both previous expe-
rience and the common threads within the model itself. This confirmation bias
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will potentially result in a model representation which is a convolution of both
the individual reports and what the security professional is expecting to see and
has seen in the past.
The approach outlined in this paper attempts to support this second ap-
proach to the post-hoc exploration of a security incident by automatically gen-
erating a model representation of the reports of an insider attack. In our approach
we have focused on taking organic narrative reports, these are a narrative that
links all actions and actors which provides more information about the inci-
dent and the protagonists as the narrative continues (rather than an episodic
narrative which considers a report constructed of a number of small incidents)
— in our experiments performed with non-experts it is clear that non-experts
tend to construct reports of these attacks as organic narratives. By computa-
tionally summarising these documents into a model representation our approach
simplifies this task and also removes elements of cognitive bias from the model
synthesis, we also anticipate that it should be able to resolve new attack vec-
tors previously unseen as the approach purely considers the corpus of natural,
organic narratives from the attack rather than previous examples of attacks.
2.2 Natural Language Processing
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a collection of methods to computation-
ally process and understand human language [24]. NLP is used for many appli-
cations that involve natural language such as machine translation [16], question
answering [16], information retrieval [30], speech recognition [31] and speech pro-
duction [31] . These allow computational activities to infer, enrich or perform
other operations on human-generate texts.
These approaches typically exploit a large corpora (collection of documents)
to build statistical, computational models of the text. These models can then
either be used to generate new insight from an existing corpus, or by applying
the models to previously unseen text and generate new insight as evidence is
gathered.
One popular approach to information retrieval and understanding the content
large documents is the use of Topic Modelling [18]. A topic model groups sta-
tistically related words, in essence creating a statistical representation of what a
piece of text is ‘about’. The most common algorithm used to create topic models
is the LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) algorithm [3]. The LDA algorithm as-
sumes that every document contains a number of topics, and every unique word
has a probability of being in every topic. Some words are more discriminative
than others, meaning the presence is more indicative of a text being related to a
particular topic. It should be noted that this is an unsupervised technique, indi-
vidual topics are not ‘curated’ they are statistical representations that elements
to emerge from the corpus.
It is common practice in Natural Language Processing to perform a set of
preprocessing tasks to normalise and prepare the corpus. This ensures that the
topic modelling approach is efficient and also increases the performance of the
model itself. First stopwords are removed, for example an English stopword
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list contains the most common English words that do not provide additional
information for topic modelling but slow down the training process, these include
words such as: ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘to’, ‘of’. Stopwords can also be domain specific, as some
words in certain contexts can similarly provide no additional information for
example when analysing news articles potential stopwords could include ‘BBC’
or other news organisations [21]. Next the tense of text is normalised using
stemming, for example this process normalises ‘walk’, ‘walking’ and ‘walked’ to
‘walk’, for topic modelling tense does not offer additional context [24]. These
processes are important to reduce the cost of training models and to ensure the
output topic models represent the most important words in the text and are
standard practice when using topic models [18].
The use of topic models to identify the relevant topics in human-generated
text provides an ideal approach to ingesting reports of insider threat, this allows
individuals to generate their own descriptions of what occurred in their own
writing style. This approach to creating narratives reduces the cognitive load of
those generating the reports, NLP can then be used to extract the topics which
appear across the entire set of narratives. We could hypothesise that these topics
would include topics related to, for example, the method used to conduct the
attack, the potential impact of the attack, information about the individual and
even social elements relating to the perpetrator and their interactions with other
staff members. This unsupervised approach will create topics which are derived
from the statistical relationships between words in the text rather than a security
professional who may be influenced by the existing body of knowledge and what
is expected to be seen or confirmation bias [26].
3 Method
The method can be separated into a data gathering phase and three main steps.
During the data gathering phase 2 corpora are created:
1. A corpus of insider threat cases taken from news articles
2. A corpus of reports relating to a single insider threat case, these are the
organic narratives from observers of the incident
Once these corpora have been collected the main three stages of the modelling
approach can be applied, first the creation and labelling of a corpus of individual
insider threat reports, second the creation and tuning of a final topic model, and
finally the creation of the final mapped report corpus. This full method is shown
visually in Figure 1.
3.1 Data Gathering
As previously discussed two corpora are required for this method, first a cor-
pus of many different types of insider threat cases, which are used to generate
a topic model. This model encapsulates the various elements of an insider at-
tack from different attacks, that could be written about, for example how the
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Insider Threat
News Articles
Individual organic
narratives of a single
Insider Threat case
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Archiving Tool
Perspectives
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Fig. 1. The full method used to refine organic narratives to a computable model
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attack was performed, who perpetrated the attack, whether or not the insider
has accomplices etc. These are used to build a model to computationally ‘un-
derstand’ insider threat and is labelled as Insider Threat News Articles in
Figure 1. The second corpus are the reports of a single incident, these are written
as organic narratives and are the corpus we wish to explore.
To create the initial corpus a number of internet sites were identified that
report on insider attacks documented on news sites, this includes mainstream
news (e.g. BBC News), technology specific sites (e.g. ZDNet) and security specific
sites (e.g. Naked Security). A custom web archiving tool was created and these
were gathered automatically, this corpus was supplemented by a complex web-
scraper that used machine-learning to identify articles about insider threat from
news feeds [28]. This creates the final corpus, with a range of insider threat cases
all following a similar writing style (that of news articles), with a total document
count of 2,700 articles.
The second corpus is the corpus of organic narratives we wish to explore, in
application within the workplace these will be gathered from any number of em-
ployees witnessing the incidents, the after-effects of the attack or the preceding
events, or indeed have simply met the perpetrator. To simulate this corpus of
organic narratives a case of insider threat attack was identified from the litera-
ture. In our experiment we chose an example case from Nurse et. al. [27] (Case
1), this case was ideal as the insider threat model had already been applied,
there were clear witnesses to the insider attack and the case matched the in-
sider threat archetype ‘Insider Fraud’ [6], a common insider threat attack. This
corpus, therefore, is the same insider threat case written with many different
writing styles.
Using this as a basis a dramatic recreation was produced presenting the case
from three witnesses creating multiple perspectives on the same event. These
three witnesses were presented as audio recordings, one witness presented as a
news report of the incident, one was presented as relating to a colleague of the
perpetrator the final perspective represented the perspective of the event from an
IT professional. These three recordings were co-created with professionals in the
respective domains to ensure the perspectives were relevant. Study participants
were then asked to listen to or read these perspectives and retell the story in their
own writing style. Participants were encouraged to write however they preferred
using formal or informal language, bullet points or full sentences and as few or
as many details as they wanted. Participants were recruited from Mechanical
Turk resulting in a final corpus of 107 documents.
3.2 Step 1: Creating Labelled/Coded Reports
The first stage as outlined in Figure 1 is to create a subset of organic narrative
reports of the incident. In order to validate the modelling approach this subset
is then manually labelled or coded according to a known insider threat model,
in our example the model from Nurse et. al. [27] — this also has the added ad-
vantage that since the case study is taken from this same paper we have the case
study already in the framework as intended by the original authors. In essence
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each sentence was allocated a code based on the element of the insider threat
model to which it was discussing, e.g. attack step, vulnerability, organisational
outcome. This was cross-coded by five independent security researchers and the
code with the highest majority was chosen.
This provided a ‘human-coded topic model’, and provides a guide to which
the final computational topic model could be compared.
3.3 Step 2: Creating and Optimising the Computational Models
The second step of the computational process is to use the large corpus of reports
to create a model related in insider threat, this is shown as step 2 in Figure 1.
This used topic modelling, specifically the LDA algorithm to discover the topics
in the documents and create a model for the topics we expect to see in reports of
insider threat. It is worth reiterating that this is an unsupervised technique which
is solely guided by the statistical relationships between words in the corpus.
Exploiting a large corpus of different insider threat news articles which refer to
different events, we expect to draw out topics related to a range of insider threat
activity, without being reliant on a single case or archetype.
To create the topic models we must choose a value of k, the number of topics.
For a large amount of documents this is likely high, although there are methods
to automatically compute potential values of k, such as [2].
In this case we do a custom optimisation step which allows us to automat-
ically generate a potential value of k by comparing the characteristics of the
computational topic model to the characteristics of the topic model generated
by the human-labelling. We make the following assumption, that two sentences
that appear within the same code or label are related and therefore we assume
that they should appear together in the same topic (or one topic is a subset of
the other). Using this desirable characteristic as a metric we can then tune the
model hyper-parameters such that this characteristic is maximised. Therefore,
the final topic model could have been computed using alternative methods such
as [2,15] or with this custom optimisation step. This forms the final output of
step 2, from our corpus the final model was generated with a k (number of top-
ics) of 370, and with the removal of stopwords related to both english language
and news domain-specific. It is worth noting that all the 370 topics will not be
populated when applied to a single case — these represent the putative topics
that the unsupervised approach identified as being present in the corpus.
3.4 Step 3: Applying and Mapping the Computational Model
The third and final step in the process as shown in Figure 1 is to apply the
model of insider threat to the organic narratives. To do this we exploit a feature
of the topic model called a priori probabilities [29]. This takes a segment of text
such as a sentence and calculates the probability of that sentence being ‘about’
each topic, in our case we simply take the highest probability topic and assign
the sentence to this topic. This does mean that some sentences can be difficult
to place in a single topic, as there can be multiple high scoring topics. Once we
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have applied the model all sentences from the organic narratives are associated
with a topic.
To evaluate the modelling approach we then need to associate each of these
computational topics to the manually coded topics. Since the manually coded
topics used a subset of these organic narratives we can identify the topics which
contain the same topics, i.e. if a particular sentence appears in topic Y of the
human generated topic model and topic X of the machine generated topic model
then we can apply the insider threat label (e.g. attack step) from topic Y to topic
Y of the machine generated model. This process allows us to add domain context
to the unsupervised computational model. It can be noted that this process is
not necessarily always accurate, as it relies on a small subset of the data that
has been coded in order to appropriately label each topic, however even with
this naive approach to labelling each topic we can see that it performs very well.
The output of this final step and indeed the final result of the whole approach
is a corpus of organic narratives associated with one insider attack, each sentence
of this corpus is mapped to a ‘topic’ and each of these ‘topics’ is mapped to the
insider threat framework created by Nurse et. al.[27].
4 Results
In this section we will discuss in depth the results of this process and the perfor-
mance of model overall. In this we highlight several results from the model, these
results are provided as the sentences from the organic narratives which are clus-
tered to one particular topic and the insider threat framework entity to which
it is related. A representative subset of these topics is shown in Figures 2 to 7.
It is worth noting in this section that the original topic model was only trained
on a corpus of insider threat news reports and not from the corpus of organic
narratives, hence these results demonstrates the training of a generic model that
‘understands’ insider threat and it’s application to a specific ‘instance’ of insider
threat.
When the topics are evaluated, there are some topics that can link to several
characteristics from the original framework or the approach is unable to map the
topic to a particular characteristics. There are many reasons this could happen,
a sentence can map to multiple characteristics or there is no strong link to an ex-
isting characteristic. For example a sentence may contain information regarding
the behaviour of an individual, this could be considered historical behaviour or
observed physical behaviour, and often a single element will have aspects of both
characteristics, an example is shown in Figure 3 where the topic contains both
a characteristic of an attack and the vulnerability that is exploited. In Figure 2,
there is no strong link between the sentences and a characteristic so it remains
unlabelled.
An alternative
In addition, the topic model, since it is unsupervised tends to be more specific
than a human, for example Topic 265 in Figure 4 and Topic 146 in Figure 5 show
two different topics which contain sentences humans both coded as ‘Personality
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Fig. 2. Topic 6
Fig. 3. Topic 205
Characteristics’. However the computational approach has separated these into
one topic that described her kindness and influence with a focus on how her col-
leagues perceived her, the other topic supplements this with additional elements
that describe her as ‘quirky’ and ‘flaky’.
These examples demonstrate that the approach is able to correctly iden-
tify the various elements and themes associated with insider threat frameworks,
however we are also interested in the relationships between these themes. These
causal and temporal relationships are particularly important in helping identify
opportunities for the reduction of the risk from insider threats as well as better-
understanding the ‘catalysts’ and pathways that enabled a particular incident.
A naive approach to linking these themes builds on the identification of the re-
ports as organic narratives in which the report is fundamentally structured in a
temporally monotonic manner, with a causal relationship that is linked to this
temporal evolution.
From this observation we can then assume that if a sentence that occurs
in Topic N is followed by a sentence in Topic Q, there is the potential of a
relationship between Topics N and Q. The directed graph of these relationships
is shown in Figure 6. Here we can see strong links between the Attack Step and
the Asset that was being attacked and the Skill Set of the attacker; between the
Precipitating Event and the Attack; between Attack step goal and Attack step
and between all Actor Characteristics which are well connected in the graph.
This initial work demonstrates that not only can the approach outlined in
this paper be used to in an unsupervised manner map organic narrative reports
to an insider threat framework but also begin to identify some of the underlying
structure in the framework. This naive approach makes an assumption that
there is a temporal and causal link between sentences, whilst this is at times
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Fig. 4. Topic 265
Fig. 5. Topic 146
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true (particularly in organic narratives) there is also a causal relationship which
may not be directly temporally correlated.
Attack	Characteristics	-	Attack
Actor	Characteristics	-	Personality	characteristics
Actor	Characteristics	-	Observed	physical	behaviour
Outcome	-	Actor
Organisation	Characteristics	-	Vulnerability/Opportunity
Actor	Characteristics	-	Historical	behaviour
Attack	Characteristics	-	Attack	Step
Actor	Characteristics	-	Psychological	State
Actor	Characteristics	-	Motivation	to	Attack
Catayst	-	Precipitating	Event Outcome	-	Organisation
Actor	Characteristics	-	Job	Info
Attack	Characteristics	-	Attack	Step	Goal
Organisation	Characteristics	-	Asset
Actor	Characteristics	-	Skill	Set
Fig. 6. The topics mapped with the naive approach
5 Discussion
The results presented demonstrate the model’s ability to map sentences from
organic narrative reports written by non-experts to an existing framework for
modelling insider threat. This is shown by exploring various topics, their links to
the insider threat model and the sentences within. However there are some areas
for potential improvement, firstly some topics do not map well to the existing
insider threat model, some topics link to multiple elements of an insider threat
model and there are some mistakes made by the model.
In general the sentences match well with the models description of each ele-
ment, following similar structures, further demonstrating the effectiveness of this
technique. For example the element ‘Attack Characteristics Attack’ is defined
in the initial report from which the case study was drawn [27] as ‘Manipulat-
ing Company Records’, although this is more general the majority of sentences
within topics that link to this characteristic are related to the overall idea of
writing fraudulent cheques as a manager in the tax office seen in topic 340 in
Figure 7. This is also true for the element ‘Organisation Characteristics - Vul-
nerability/Opportunity’ which was described in [27] as ‘Manual records, easily
manipulated’ and ‘Inadequate security and processing (of records)’, in Topic
132 in Figure 8 we see sentences regarding the auditing of records, a clear exam-
ple of the inadequate security and sentences regarding the paper based system
in use, once again an example of manual records. These two examples clearly
demonstrate the unsupervised computational approach identifying similar char-
acteristics that the authors of the initial case study expected to identify.
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Fig. 7. Topic 340
Fig. 8. Topic 132
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As discussed above some topics do not map well to the insider threat model,
and therefore may not be associated with a characteristic within the insider
threat framework. However this may also highlight a missing piece of a frame-
work, emerging factors of an incident which have not yet been considered or as
parts of other characteristics which have not been fully understood. An example
from this case study is that the computational approach separated the ‘outcome’
theme from the framework into an outcome associated with the actor (the per-
petrator of the attack) and an outcome associated with the organisation. This is
is an interesting reflection with respect to our understanding of insider threat.
In addition to the issues with assigning topics to characteristics, another issue
is the mislabelling of some sentences. For example, consider Topic 84 shown in
Figure 9, the majority of sentences refer to the insider being caught, investigated,
sent to court and asked to pay a fine, however, the final sentence ‘The computer
system was difficult to use and tax office staff found it an extra burden’ is
clearly an outlier. Although this is an issue, many of the mislabelled sentences
are semantically different, this allows these sentences to be filtered out from
the overall topic. To reduce the number of these sentences this we take the
approach representing the sentences as a graph using co-reference resolution to
join matching actors such as ‘co-workers’ to ‘her office’, and ‘accomplices’ to
‘co-fraudsters’. The directed graph from these co-references would create highly
connected graph referring to the intended characteristic, and a disjointed sub-
graph referring to the computer system and tax office.
Fig. 9. Topic 84
It is clear that there are potential improvements that can be made, however
the results still demonstrate the ability of topic models to computationally map
a set of non-technical organic narratives to an existing technical security frame-
work. Using topic modelling allows for additional advantages such as a model
evolving as new reports are added, improving the model over time for a specific
organisation.
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The initial work in reconstructing a framework demonstrates that it is possi-
ble to link these topics together and to create a custom insider threat framework.
Although further work needs to be done to explore causal links or temporal links,
initial work shows that strongly linked characteristics already exist in the frame-
work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated an approach using Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) to computationally map organic narrative reports of insider threat
attacks written in ‘natural’ language to an existing insider threat framework.
This significantly reduces the barriers to gathering and generating actionable
insight from a wide range of employees within an organisation. Reducing the
cognitive load and the requirement for security knowledge we can improve the
breadth of viewpoints of the incident and also reduce the effect of any confirma-
tion bias in the model synthesis and hence improve the accuracy of a post-hoc
model representation of the incident. In turn, this improved model representa-
tion improves the evidence used to generate an organisation’s response to an
incident with the ultimate aim of making organisations more secure.
By empowering the entire employee base to engage in an exercise, it is also
possible to generate a more insightful study of an incident, it is also possible to
hypothesis a study where an entire employee base write a short piece of prose of
how they would compromise an organisation. These would form an interesting set
of narratives that could be used to generate hypothetical models which represent
the ‘everyday’ vulnerabilities that employees note as they go about their daily
business.
This work forms a small part of a larger project to use NLP in understanding
the threat from insider activity. The aim of which is to create a custom framework
for each incident, which can merge, grow and evolve as the organisation experi-
ences different attacks. With the ultimate goal of helping organisations develop
appropriate and proportionate security decision to manage the risk from insider
attack whilst empowering the entire employee-base to support the security of
the organisation.
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